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Abstract 
 
Despite their popularity, buyer–seller relationships are often dissatisfying and engender 
destructive behavior, such as opportunism and exit by one partner. To explain destructive 
behavior, previous supply chain management studies primarily focused on the influence of 
situational factors, such as social and economic dissatisfaction, without accounting for 
managers’ risk propensity. Accounting for risk is critical though, because destructive behavior 
in buyer–seller relationships cannot be dissociated from the people who manage them. 
Drawing on risk and buyer–seller literature, the authors develop and empirically test a model 
that incorporates a moderating effect of the risk perceptions of situational factors on the 
relationship between a manager’s risk propensity and the inclination to exit the relationship 
and act opportunistically. A survey of purchasing managers indicates that the positive 
relationship between risk propensity and destructive behavior is strengthened by social 
dissatisfaction and mitigated by economic dissatisfaction. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the nature of buyer–seller relationships has shifted, from arm’s-length 
transactions to long-term exchange relationships (Claycomb and Frankwick, 2010). The 
increasing popularity of these relationships reflects their ability to help partners mitigate the 
risk and uncertainty associated with the provision of critical supplies (Geiger et al., 2012). 
However, managing such relationships is fraught with problems and challenges (Ferguson and 
Johnston, 2011). In response to these adversities, in most buyer–seller relationships one of the 
parties eventually engages in an action that the other partner considers destructive to the 
relationship (Kumar et al., 1998). These destructive behaviors, such as opportunism (Heide 
and John, 1990; Hawkins et al., 2008) and one-sided exit (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2000) enable 
an exchange partner to realize short-term gains, often at the expense of relationship continuity 
(Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). While advances have been made in the study of destructive 
behaviors, the discussion has been somewhat limited in two ways. 
 First, when investigating destructive behavior, supply chain management studies primarily 
focused on relationship-level factors, such as partners’ dissatisfaction, commitment, and exit 
barriers (Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping, 1993; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). An understanding of 
these situational drivers provides insight in how destructive behavior can be prevented. Ping 
(1999) suggests, for example, that to hold exit at bay exchange partners may increase cost-of-
exit and satisfaction, or allow a partner to voice its concerns. Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) 
distinguish between economic and social satisfaction and unearth that the two types of 
dissatisfaction directly and interactively discourage the use of destructive responses. Whereas 
these studies explain why specific relationship situations trigger or prevent destructive 
behavior, they neglect to account for the decision-maker. Destructive behavior in buyer–seller 
relationships, cannot be dissociated from the people who manage those relationships (Aldrich 
and Herker, 1977). 
 Second, most studies adopted a relationship-oriented approach and conceptualized 
destructive behavior as an immediate response that is damaging in regard to the future of a 
buyer–seller relationship (Hibbard et al., 2001; Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). This narrow 
conceptualization precludes risk. A decision to unilaterally, intentionally, and deceitfully act 
against the interest of the relationship, is likely to result from a comparison of the risks 
associated with short-term gains obtained through destructive behavior with the risks 
associated with future gains obtained from not acting destructively. For example, unilaterally 
exiting a buyer–seller relationship or acting opportunistically poses a risk to the firm in that it 
can trigger retaliation and induce reputation losses (Poppo et al., 2008). Conversely, refraining 
from exiting (i.e., opting for the continuation of the relationship) also imposes a risk, as in the 
near future the relationship may not deliver on its promise or the exchange partner may engage 
in destructive behavior (Parkhe, 1993). We suggest that there is value in conceptualizing 
destructive behavior as risk behavior. This also implies, per Sitkin and Pablo (1992), that, in 
addition to relationship-level factors, destructive behavior is influenced by decision makers’ 
risk propensity and risk perceptions. 
 Therefore, the objective of this study is to develop and empirically test a model that 
incorporates a moderating effect of the risk perceptions of situational factors on the 
relationship between a manager’s risk propensity and its inclination to engage in destructive 
behavior. Taking the buyer perspective, we focus on three destructive responses—exit, passive 
opportunism, and active opportunism (Hawkins et al., 2008; Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping 1993, 
1999; Wathne and Heide, 2000)—and two situational factors that frame managers’ perceptions 
of the riskiness of destructive behavior—economic and social dissatisfaction (Geyskens and 
Steenkamp, 2000; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). In building our model, we focus on these 
behaviors and situational factors, because they previously have been identified as key 
antecedents of relationship processes and outcomes. To test our model empirically, we 
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conducted a survey of 262 purchasing managers. 
 We contribute to supply chain management literature by demonstrating that managers’ risk 
propensity is a salient factor that affects destructive behavior and that the interplay of risk 
propensity and perceptions of situational factors effectively explain managers’ intentions to 
use destructive behavior in buyer–seller relationships. We also contribute to risk behavior 
literature by combining trait and cognition approaches (see Sitkin and Pablo, 1992), in a novel 
way. Specifically, we demonstrate that a manager’s perception of the riskiness of a situation 
(cognition) and risk propensity (trait) interactively influence risk behavior. The results also 
have implications from a managerial point of view, because these insights can help managers 
to improve risk management (Grudinschi et al., 2014; Hoffman et al., 2013). Extending 
relationship-level risk management approaches (Harland et al., 2003) with manager’s risk 
propensity will enable decision-makers to better steer buyer–seller relationships toward more 
collaborative and successful outcomes. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1. Destructive behavior in buyer–seller relationships 
Destructive behavior is defined as an action that has a negative impact on the viability or 
functioning of a buyer–seller relationship (Hibbard et al., 2001). Three types of destructive 
behaviors appear in prior buyer–seller literature: exit, passive opportunism, and active 
opportunism (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993, 1999). Each behavior represents a 
different decision-making situation, such that managers must determine whether they should 
act destructively or not, according to their assessments of the gains and losses associated with 
each decision (Parkhe, 1993). By developing and testing hypotheses related to all three types 
of destructive behavior, we seek to increase the nomological validity of our empirical results. 
 Exit indicates a buyer’s disinclination to continue the current relationship (Ping, 1999), as 
might be manifested when it ceases to procure a supplier’s products (Ping, 1993). As a 
destructive response (e.g., Pressey and Qiu, 2007), exit induces the termination of the current 
relationship (Park and Ungson, 2001). A buyer is likely to exit a supplier relationship when the 
anticipated value of the relationship is smaller than the expected costs (Zajac and Olsen, 
1993), such that exiting provides short-terms benefits for the exiting partner. However, exiting 
a relationship also might require the development of a relationship with a new supplier, so it 
entails risk (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), especially if new suppliers predict the buyer’s future 
behavior on the basis of its past behavior, which would cast the shadow of the past on the new 
relationship (Parkhe, 1993). Thus, unilaterally ending a long-term relationship likely tarnishes 
the reputation of the exiting partner, which makes it more difficult to find a trusting partner in 
the future (Poppo et al., 2008). Conversely, maintaining the relationship might be valuable as a 
means to generate long-term value (Zajac and Olsen, 1993), but it too entails risk. A buyer 
cannot foresee with certainty if its current supplier will behave destructively in the future 
(Parkhe, 1993). In addition, the future value of the relationship is uncertain, such that not 
exiting the relationship might result in escalating commitments to an underperforming venture 
(Patzelt and Shepherd, 2008). 
 Opportunism refers to “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975, p. 6); it occurs 
when firms have individual interests that are not necessarily congruent with those of their 
partners (Das and Rahman, 2010; Das and Teng, 2001). By acting opportunistically, a buyer 
can extract short-term value from its supplier but also opens itself to future sanctions and 
retaliation (John, 1984). When a buyer has expectations that the relationship will endure, 
opportunism becomes especially risky, because the supplier has an extended time frame in 
which to retaliate (Joshi and Stump, 1999). As Heide and John (1990, p. 26) note, “future 
interaction between exchange partners provides an opportunity to reward good behavior and 
punish opportunism,” casting the shadow of the future on the relationship. Thus, opportunism 
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entails performance risk, because it undermines the value-creation logic for the relationship 
(Wathne and Heide, 2000). Opportunism also is risky due to its potential for initiating 
destructive, tit-for-tat strategies (Joshi and Stump, 1999). By potentially triggering retaliation, 
opportunism could lead to the deterioration of the relationship and reduce its future value 
creation potential. Even when suppliers depend on the current relationship and cannot openly 
retaliate against powerful buyers (Kumar et al., 1998), their commitment to the relationship 
likely deteriorates in the face of opportunism (Frazier et al., 1989; Van Bruggen et al., 2005). 
Preserving relationship quality can create value in the future, but not acting opportunistically 
also involves relational risk, because again, buyers cannot foresee if their suppliers will engage 
in destructive behaviors in the future (Das and Teng, 2001). In this sense, failing to act 
opportunistically soon enough is risky, because the firm may lose the opportunity to 
appropriate additional value preemptively from its partner, before a conflict arises or the 
relationship is terminated. 
 Wathne and Heide (2000) distinguish two forms of opportunism—passive and active—
though both are sources of benefits and risk. Passive opportunism exists when one party 
purposefully withholds its effort, such as by shirking or evading obligations (John, 1984). 
When new circumstances arise, passive opportunism might take the form of inflexibility or 
refusal to adapt (Wathne and Heide, 2000) or negligence (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; 
Ping 1993). Passive opportunism is difficult to detect because of its ambiguity (Carson et al., 
2006), so simple monitoring may not be sufficient to identify it (Das, 2005), which implies the 
potential for short-term benefits to the opportunistic partner. Even if sanctioning passive 
opportunism is difficult and relatively unlikely (Wathne and Heide, 2000), the behavior still 
entails risk, because of the extensive period of time available for retaliation. In contrast, active 
opportunism implies that one party actively engages in behaviors that are explicitly or 
implicitly prohibited within the relationship or uses new circumstances to extract concessions 
from its partner (Wathne and Heide, 2000), such as breaching a distribution contract by selling 
in an unauthorized territory, delaying payments, or supplying misleading information. Active 
opportunism has the potential to provide more benefits to the perpetrating party than passive 
opportunism, but it is also more risky, because it is easily discernible and can be identified 
through monitoring, such that it likely leads to sanctions (Das, 2005). 
 Although exit, passive opportunism, and active opportunism constitute three separate 
types of destructive behaviors, they share key characteristics. All three behaviors are 
intentional, unilateral, and deceitful, and self-interested partners use them to increase their 
short-term benefits. Destructive behavior is intentional (Hibbard et al., 2001), such that a 
manager’s decision to act destructively or not results from an assessment of the positive and 
negative consequences of this behavior. Moreover, destructive behavior is unilateral (Tjemkes 
and Furrer, 2010), so the decision to act destructively or not occurs without the consent of the 
partner. Finally, all three forms of destructive behavior are deceitful (Das, 2005), and acting 
destructively should have negative repercussions for partners and their performance. Before 
acting destructively, managers must assess the risks of their behavior, so their decision should 
depend on their risk propensity. 
 
2.2. Risk propensity and risk perception 
Following Sitkin and Weingart (1995), we define risk propensity as a trait that reflects “an 
individual’s current tendency to take or avoid risks” (p. 1575). Risk propensity emerges from 
prior experience and risk preferences (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992) and predisposes people to make 
risky decisions and engage in risky behavior (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). Broadly defined, 
risk refers to uncertainty or variance in outcomes with some significance (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Whereas uncertainty implies a condition of unsure outcomes, risk is “a 
condition in which the consequences of a decision and the probabilities associated with the 
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consequences are known entities” (Baird and Thomas, 1985, p. 231). In this sense, uncertainty 
might be regarded as part of the risk construct (Das and Teng, 2004). 
 Risk propensity pertains to an individual’s preference for more uncertain outcomes 
compared with more certain ones (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). In addition, risk is embedded in 
time, so risk propensity involves a preference for present rather than future outcomes, which 
are more uncertain (Frederick et al., 2002); risk-averse people tend to discount time more than 
risk-prone decision makers (Das and Teng, 1997). Time discounting implies a tendency to 
place a higher value on an outcome that occurs earlier compared with the value assigned were 
it to occur later (Frederick et al., 2002). People who discount time thus tend to consider the 
immediate outcomes of a decision more closely and underscore the future consequences. Risk-
averse managers, compared with risk-prone ones, prefer sure gains in the present or near 
future to uncertain gains in the more distant future, even if the latter gains might be greater. 
Similarly, risk-averse managers prefer known losses in the present or near future over 
unknown losses in the more distant future. 
 As risk is socially constructed rather than an objective reality of the world (Slovic, 1999), 
to assess the relationship between risk propensity and destructive behaviors, it is critical to 
account for situational factors though (Kühberger et al., 2002), which should influence 
managers’ cognitive perceptions of the riskiness of the behaviors (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). The 
cognitive framing effect of situational factors appears in several empirical studies that reveal 
that the sign and strength of the relationship between risk propensity and risk behavior vary 
across contexts. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) find that people who seek to 
protect prior gains make less risky choices than those without prior gains to protect; Osborn 
and Jackson (1988) instead find that past success leads to more risky behavior. Staw, 
Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) also find that when people are threatened by likely losses, they 
become more rigid and make less risky decisions. Similarly, March and Shapira (1987) 
demonstrate that when the situation is perceived positively (i.e., full of opportunities), people 
make more risky choices; if they perceive the situation negatively (i.e., full of threats), they 
tend to make less risky choices. In the light of these ambiguous results, we propose that the 
effect of risk propensity on risk behavior is moderated by perceptions of the riskiness of the 
situational factors. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Using a buyer perspective, we hypothesize that in buyer–seller relationships, the link between 
a manager’s risk propensity and his or her intention to use destructive behavior depends on 
two situational factors: economic and social dissatisfaction. Other factors could have 
influences as well, but we focus on these two relational factors, because prior research has 
demonstrated their effects on destructive behavior in buyer–seller relationships (Geyskens and 
Steenkamp, 2000; Hibbard et al., 2001; Ping, 1993). Economic and social dissatisfaction also 
are particularly relevant for our study because they invoke different temporal orientations for 
the relationship partners. A long-term orientation implies necessary commitment to a good 
working relationship; a short-term orientation stresses prompt results that energize the alliance. 
Managers with a short-term orientation view a buyer–seller relationship as transitional in 
nature and demand quick, tangible results. In contrast, a manager with a long-term orientation 
regards buyer–seller relationships as semi-permanent entities that require commitment and 
patience (Joshi and Stump, 1999). Social satisfaction accordingly relates to a manager’s long-
term orientation, whereas economic satisfaction is more important when a manager holds a 
short-term orientation. Because risk-averse and risk-prone managers have different time 
orientations, economic and social dissatisfaction likely represent two distinct cognitive 
framing contexts, with different moderating effects on the relationship between risk propensity 
and destructive behavior. Figure 1 graphically represents our hypothesized model. 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
 Economic dissatisfaction reflects a manager’s negative evaluation of the financial 
outcomes of a relationship, resulting from a negative discrepancy between expected and actual 
financial outcomes (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Economic dissatisfaction shifts the 
manager’s focus from long-terms opportunities to short-term threats (Staw et al., 1981). In 
economically dissatisfying relationships, calculative commitment is affected (Gilliland and 
Bello, 2002), and managers seek to restore efficiency quickly, before the performance of the 
relationship further deteriorates. In such an adverse situation (Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010), 
partners that do not engage in destructive behavior, in the hope of preserving the relationship, 
suffer sure economic losses in the present and uncertain benefits from the relationship in the 
future. These present and future outcomes contrast with the benefits of acting destructively, 
which likely accrue in the present and are more certain, as well as the negative consequences, 
such as retaliation or loss of reputation (Zajac and Olsen, 1993), that are more uncertain, as 
they only have consequences in the future. 
 When a buyer–seller relationship underperforms economically, destructive behavior may 
appear less risky than not acting destructively, because destructive behaviors generate 
immediate and sure returns, in contrast with the uncertainty associated with persistent 
economic underperformance. Confronted with a pressing challenge to deal with economic 
underperformance, more risk-averse managers value the sure gains from acting destructively 
more and discount the potential future losses associated with the consequences of such 
behavior. More risk-prone managers instead discount the potential future benefits of 
preserving the relationship less and value them more than the benefits of destructive behavior, 
which may be limited because of the underperformance of the relationship. That is, as 
economic dissatisfaction increases, the association between risk propensity and destructive 
behavior may switch from positive to negative; the more risk-prone managers are, the less 
likely they are to behave destructively compared with more risk-averse managers. 
When economic dissatisfaction decreases, the association between risk propensity and 
destructive behavior may become more positive, such that more risk-prone managers tend to 
act more destructively than risk-averse managers. The relationship is generating benefits in the 
present, so more risk-averse managers are unlikely to endanger the relationship by acting 
destructively. In contrast, more risk-prone managers value the benefits to be gained from 
destructive behavior, because the costs of such behavior are uncertain, and if they occur, they 
will accrue only in the future. 
 In accordance with our arguments, some empirical studies demonstrate that when 
economic dissatisfaction is high, behaving destructively appears less risky than not acting this 
way; when economic dissatisfaction in low, behaving destructively is perceived as more risky 
than not doing so. Joshi and Stump (1999) find that managers who expect a buyer–seller 
relationship to last for an extended period are less likely to behave opportunistically, due to the 
shadow of the future created by the opportunity for retaliation (Poppo et al., 2008). In 
economically satisfying relationships, behaving opportunistically therefore seems more risky 
than not behaving opportunistically (Parkhe, 1993). Liu et al. (2010) further find that 
managers who conduct cost-and-benefit calculations to evaluate their buyer–seller 
relationships likely notice their partner’s opportunism. When partners have a short-term 
orientation, due to their economic dissatisfaction, opportunism is more likely to be detected, 
which increases the chances of retaliation, so both active and passive opportunistic behaviors 
become more risky than not behaving opportunistically. Geiger et al. (2012) find that 
managers who value their buyer–seller relationships more also are less likely to exit; in such a 
situation, exiting is perceived as more risky than continuing it. Thus, we hypothesize: 
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H1. Managers’ economic dissatisfaction moderates the relationship between risk propensity 
and destructive behavior, such that for less economically dissatisfied managers, the 
relationship of risk propensity with (a) exit, (b) passive opportunism, and (c) active 
opportunism is positive, whereas for more economically dissatisfied managers, these 
relationships are negative. 
  
 Social dissatisfaction is a manager’s negative evaluation of the psychosocial aspects of a 
relationship, reflecting a negative discrepancy between expected and actual quality in the 
working relationship (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). Compared with economic 
dissatisfaction, social dissatisfaction shifts the manager’s cognitive focus from the short-term 
opportunities of maintaining the relationship to potential threats in the future (Zajac and Olsen, 
1993). In socially dissatisfying situations, managers’ affective commitment likely diminishes 
(Gilliland and Bello, 2002), so relationship continuity is endangered (Geyskens and 
Steenkamp, 2000), because the promise of future joint collaborative efforts, such as flexibility, 
adaptability, and learning, are limited (Das and Teng, 2000). 
 When a buyer–seller relationship is socially dissatisfying, destructive behavior may 
appear more risky than not acting, because not behaving destructively allows for the 
preservation of the relationship’s current benefits. Behaving destructively instead entails the 
risk of conflict escalation in the future. When the relationship is characterized by high social 
dissatisfaction, the likelihood of conflict and the chance that the partner behaves destructively 
are very high (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Therefore, the more risk-averse managers are, the less 
likely they are to behave destructively, so they can avoid triggering destructive retaliation from 
their partner. In such a situation, risk-averse managers prefer the present gains of preserving 
the current relationship to the uncertain outcomes of a destructive conflict; more risk-prone 
managers instead prefer the potential gains they can extract from destructive behavior and are 
willing to accept the risk of conflict, betting on gaining a first-mover advantage through a 
preventive strike. As social dissatisfaction increases, the association between risk propensity 
and destructive behavior likely grows more positive, such that the more risk-prone managers 
are, the greater the chances that they will behave destructively compared with more risk-
averse managers. 
 In contrast, when a buyer–seller relationship is socially satisfying, destructive behavior 
should seem less risky than not acting. When social dissatisfaction is low, the perceived risks 
of destructive behavior also are likely to be low, because the affective commitment of the 
partner creates some forgiveness for destructive behavior (Ganesan et al., 2010; Geiger et al., 
2012; Liu et al., 2010). Therefore, when social dissatisfaction is low, risk-averse managers 
prefer present gains from destructive behavior and discount the risk of retaliation; risk-prone 
managers instead refrain from destructive behavior, preferring to bet on the future gains 
generated by the relationship rather than the relatively small gains they could extract in the 
present from their destructive behavior. When social dissatisfaction decreases, the association 
between risk propensity and destructive behavior is likely to move from positive to negative; 
the more risk-prone managers are, the less likely they will behave destructively compared with 
more risk-averse managers. 
 Indirectly supporting this line of argument, a few empirical studies have shown that when 
social dissatisfaction is high, behaving destructively is perceived as more risky than not acting 
in this way; when social dissatisfaction is low, it seems less risky than otherwise. For example, 
Ganesan et al. (2010) and Geiger et al. (2012) find that in relationships characterized by high 
affective commitment, managers forgive mild opportunism by their partners, but they do not 
do so in relationships with low affective commitment. The strength of interfirm bonds 
determines parties’ propensity to accept temporary disadvantages and exhibit relational 
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tolerance (Bello et al., 2010). In such situations, opportunism—and passive opportunism in 
particular—likely appears less risky. Similarly, Gilliland and Bello (2002) find that when 
affective commitment is low because social dissatisfaction is high, the use of contractual 
enforcement mechanisms becomes more likely. Thus, opportunistic behavior is more likely to 
be detected, especially if it is active, and be perceived as risky compared with not behaving 
opportunistically. Patzelt and Shepherd (2008) find that managers might decide to persist with 
a current relationship even if social dissatisfaction is high, to avoid damaging their reputation. 
The shadow of the past should exert a strong effect on managers’ perceptions of the 
termination of the relationship as risky, because a bad relational reputation could make finding 
alternative partners more difficult (Poppo et al., 2008). Alajoutsijärvi et al. (2000) also find 
that when social dissatisfaction is low and relational quality is high, exiting the relationship 
might be less damaging and less risky, because the partner is unlikely to seek to damage its 
own reputation. Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
H2. Managers’ social dissatisfaction moderates the relationship between risk propensity and 
destructive behavior, such that for less socially dissatisfied managers, the relationship of risk 
propensity with (a) exit, (b) passive opportunism, and (c) active opportunism is negative, 
whereas for more socially dissatisfied managers, the relationships are positive. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1 Data collection 
To test our hypotheses, we developed an online survey and collected data from Dutch 
purchasing managers, whose contact details we obtained from a relevant business association. 
A link to the online survey was sent by e-mail to 2,239 purchase managers in the Netherlands. 
We asked respondents to read a screening question before participating in the project to ensure 
that only buyer–seller relationships consistent with the scope of our research were included in 
the final sample. We asked respondents to select a buyer–seller relationship that involved a 
long-term contractual arrangement; thus, we decreased the likelihood that governance forms, 
such as joint ventures, licenses, or franchises, appeared in the final data set. Because the 
number of purchase managers that not qualified is unknown, the response rate is a 
conservative estimate. The procedure resulted in 265 questionnaires, for a response rate of 
11.8%, which is reasonable for this relatively long online survey (Deutskens et al., 2004). 
 To assess non-response bias we compared early respondents and late respondents with 
respect to every individual questionnaire item and found no significant differences between the 
two groups. In addition, following Mentzer and Flint (1997) we contacted by telephone a 
random sample of 30 non-respondents and asked them five questions related to constructs 
under investigation. Based on a series of t-tests we found no significant differences between 
the answers of respondents and non-respondents to these questions. 
 Consistent with previous buyer–seller research (Heide and John, 1990; Lambe et al., 
2002), we used self-reporting and collected data from only one side of the dyadic relationship, 
namely, a manager from a buyer firm. The self-reporting approach adopted in this study is 
appropriate as the key variables in the study pertain to individuals’ characteristics. That is, risk 
propensity denotes an personality trait and response strategy preference pertains to an 
individual’s disposition to react to a situation. To reduce concerns about perceptual biases, we 
asked one question to ensure the respondent was knowledgeable about the selected buyer–
seller relationship. On a seven-point Likert scale, with a cutoff value of 3, a low score 
indicated the respondent possessed little knowledge about the buyer–seller relationship. Only 
three respondents did not meet this criterion and were eliminated from further analysis, 
resulting in a final sample of 262. The average score across the sample was 5.8 (SD = 1.3) for 
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knowledgeability, comparable to the level in prior research (Jap and Anderson 2003), which 
suggests that we used appropriate respondents for our data analysis. The job titles (e.g., head 
of purchasing, senior purchasing manager, vendor manager, general manager) also indicated 
their ample knowledge of buyer–seller relationships. 
 The respondents worked for firms in two broad sectors: production/manufacturing 
(50.4%) and services (49.6%). On average, these firms had 4,238 employees (standard 
deviation [SD] = 17,621) and had managed 20.8 buyer–seller relationships (SD = 50.5) in the 
past five years. The average duration of a relationship was 7.0 years (SD = 8.3). The 
respondents, mostly male managers (239, or 91.2%), were 46.7 years (SD = 7.5). 
 
3.2 Measures 
To measure managers’ preferences for the three destructive behaviors, we adapted existing 
scales developed in English that we translated into Dutch, using standard translation–back-
translation procedures. The seven-point Likert scales ranged from (1) “I would definitely not 
react in this way” to (7) “I would definitely react in this way.” For exit, we adapted items from 
Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) and Ping (1999) and asked respondents to indicate their 
intentions to terminate the buyer–seller relationship. To measure passive opportunism, we 
adapted items developed by Ping (1993) to capture negligent relational behavior and modified 
them to cover its destructive aspect, such as not dealing with the situation and putting no more 
resources into the relationship. The scale used to measure active opportunism came from John 
(1984) and Ping (1993) and refers to withholding information, exaggerating the averse nature 
of the situation, and seeking to escape contractual obligations. 
 To measure social and economic dissatisfaction, we built on prior work (Geyskens and 
Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993; Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010) and used items to capture a 
manager’s satisfaction with the quality of the social interactions and the economic 
performance of the relationship. The social dissatisfaction items measure the extent to which 
the interaction between the partners is perceived as complicated, unfulfilling, and 
disappointing (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). The economic dissatisfaction measure 
indicated the extent to which a manager is financially satisfied with the alliance, according to 
four items that measured managers’ level of satisfaction with the alliance in terms of profit, 
performance, goal achievement, and efficiency (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000). We 
measured satisfaction rather than dissatisfaction to reduce multicollinearity issues and reversed 
the results prior to our analyses. The correlation between the dissatisfaction measures is .40, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not likely to be of concern. Finally, for risk propensity, we 
used four items developed by Jaworski and Kohli (1993) to evaluate the extent to which a 
manager is risk prone or averse. All items appear in the Appendix. 
 Destructive behavior could be influenced by factors other than economic and social 
dissatisfaction and managers’ risk propensity. We therefore controlled for three firm-, three 
relationship-, and three individual-level variables identified in prior literature. At the firm 
level, we controlled for firm size (natural logarithm of the number of employees), because 
larger firms with more resources may assess the risk associated with destructive behavior 
differently (Lambe et al., 2002). We also controlled for a firm’s power relative to its partner’s 
by adding a seven-point Likert scale to capture the degree to which the buyer possesses a 
bargaining advantage over its supplying partner. A bargaining power advantage reduces the 
risk of retaliation and thus should trigger more risk-taking preferences (Van Bruggen et al., 
2005). We created a dummy variable to capture the firm’s sector: production/manufacturing or 
services. However, the industry dummy was not significant, so we removed it from further 
analyses, for parsimony. 
 At the relationship level, we controlled for alliance duration, the presence of attractive 
alternatives, and relationship-specific investments. With regard to alliance duration (measured 
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as the natural logarithm of the number of years in operation), managers involved in older 
relationships may be less inclined to act destructively (Ferguson and Johnston, 2011; Liu et al., 
2010). Attractive alternatives decrease the risk of exiting the relationship, but the presence of 
relationship-specific investments increases its costs (e.g., Ping, 1999; Rokkan et al., 2003; 
Williamson, 1975). To operationalize these variables, we used three items each, adapted from 
Ping (1999) and measured on seven-point Likert scales. We discarded one indicator of 
relationship-specific investments due to its lack of reliability. The final reliability of the scales 
was acceptable, with Cronbach’s alphas of .75 to .70. 
 At the individual level, personal characteristics beyond risk propensity might influence 
preferences for destructive behavior. First, we controlled for a manager’s long-term orientation 
by adding a seven-point Likert scale; managers with more distant planning horizons should be 
less likely to act destructively (Das and Teng, 1997). Second, we considered individual 
experience, because more experienced managers might respond differently than less 
experienced managers (Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). Third, we controlled for managers’ social 
desirability tendency by including the M-C2 version of the Marlowe-Crowne social 
desirability scale (Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972); opportunism in particular may be influenced by 
the social desirability bias (Hawkins et al., 2009). 
 
3.3 Analytical method 
As the main method of analysis, we used partial least squares (PLS) path modeling as 
implemented in ADANCO 1.0 (Henseler and Dijkstra, 2014). As a variance-based technique, 
PLS aims to maximize the explained variance of the endogenous variables. Even with many 
parameters, as are required for estimating moderating effects, it supports smaller sample sizes 
than covariance-based structural equation modeling techniques (Hair et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, PLS does not rely on distributional assumptions, which is a relevant factor in the 
presence of heavily right-skewed variables (Cassel et al., 1999). Because our structural model 
is saturated, the major disadvantage of PLS, namely, the lack of a global goodness-of-fit 
measure (Henseler and Sarstedt, 2013), is not a concern for our study. To avoid possible non-
convergence issues, we chose a factor-weighting scheme and used a centroid scheme for 
triangulation (Henseler, 2010). Because PLS is based on a nonparametric estimation 
procedure, we applied bootstrapping with 5000 resamples for the significance tests (Chin, 
1998). 
 We used a two-step procedure to assess the adequacy of the model (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988). First, we assessed the measurement model with regard to reliability and 
validity. For all multi-item measurements, we ensured sufficient levels of internal consistency 
reliability, unidimensionality, and discriminant validity. Second, we examined the structural 
model with regard to its significance and the substantiality of the effects. We created and 
compared three hierarchically ordered structural models: a first model with only the control 
variables, a second with the added direct effects, and a third model containing the moderating 
effects too. 
 With a hybrid orthogonalizing approach, we analyzed the moderating effects (Henseler 
and Chin, 2010). Orthogonalization (also called residual centering) means that instead of 
simply multiplying the interacting variables, we regressed the product of the interacting 
variables on the two original variables. The residuals served as the interaction terms. 
Orthogonalization eliminated the potential problems of multicollinearity, as are often 
encountered in analyses of moderating effects (Cronbach, 1987). It also facilitates the 
interpretation of regression coefficients, in that the single effects resulting from a regression 
with moderating effects strongly resemble the main effects obtained from a model without 
moderating effects. Here, hybrid refers to the approximated scores for the interaction term in 
each iteration of the PLS algorithm, which reflects the original approach proposed by Wold 
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(1982) to incorporate nonlinear effects into PLS path models. In contrast with other 
approaches (see Goodhue et al., 2007), the hybrid approach does not capitalize on chance. 
Despite preventive measures, including reversing scales and residual centering for each model, 
we still assessed the possibility of multicollinearity by examining the variance inflation 
factors, all of which were smaller than the cutoff value of 3. Thus, multicollinearity was not a 
problem (Hair et al., 2006). 
 Self-reporting may raise concerns about common method variance. We reduced these 
concerns by designing a questionnaire with different scale endpoints and creating 
psychological separation between the independent and dependent variables (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). In addition, to quantify common method variance and control for its remaining effects, 
we also included a marker variable in the questionnaire. The marker variable approach excels 
in terms of efficacy (Richardson et al., 2009). Because the marker variable we chose captures 
the corporate-level strategy of the firm, it is theoretically unrelated to our study. This marker 
variable did not exert any effect on exit or active opportunism but had some influence on 
passive opportunism. To assess the extent of common method variance, we compared the path 
coefficients of two models, with and without the marker variable. The results showed no 
significant differences between models, indicating limited common method variance concerns. 
To account fully for common method variance, we retained the marker as a control variable. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Measurement model 
To assess the reliability and validity of the construct measurements, we followed Hair et al. 
(2012). The internal consistency reliability was estimated using Cronbach’s alpha (α) and 
Jöreskog’s rho (ρc). Whereas α is typically a lower bound for reliability, ρc (which relies on the 
upward-biased construct loadings of PLS; Gefen et al., 2011) likely overestimates reliability. 
The true reliability of construct scores thus should lie between α and ρc. As Table 1 shows, all 
constructs exhibited sufficient levels of internal consistency reliability. In one case, α lies 
slightly below .70, but because the composite reliability is substantially higher, a common 
criterion of reliability is fulfilled (see Nunnally, 1978). The Appendix lists the indicators and 
their standardized loadings. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 We assessed the validity of the construct measurement in terms of unidimensionality and 
discriminant validity (Hair et al. 2012). For convergent validity, we used the average variance 
extracted (AVE). All AVE values except one were above the critical value of .50 (Fornell and 
Larcker, 1981); only the AVE value of passive opportunism (.47) was slightly below the 
threshold. We next conducted Sahmer et al.’s (2006) non-parametric test of unidimensionality 
using 1,000,000 bootstrap permutations. This test considers the first two eigenvalues of a set 
of indicators, whereas the AVE considers only the first. As the four rightmost columns of Table 
1 demonstrate, all first eigenvalues exceeded their respective critical values; all second 
eigenvalues fell below their respective critical values. Thus, the likelihood of confounding the 
first two dimensions is very low. Overall, our assessment provides evidence of the 
unidimensionality of all constructs. 
 With regard to the descriptive statistics, Table 2 contains the square root of the AVE 
values and the interconstruct correlations. A comparison of the greatest absolute construct 
correlation (.57 between passive opportunism and exit) with the smallest square root of the 
AVE (.69 of neglect) affirmed the Fornell-Larcker criterion, in support of discriminant validity. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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4.2 Structural model 
To determine how much additional variance is explained by the independent and moderating 
variables, after accounting for the controls, we ran three separate models for each dependent 
variable, such that we entered the control variables in model 1; economic dissatisfaction, 
social dissatisfaction, and risk propensity in model 2; and the interactions in step 3. We tracked 
the changes in the adjusted squared multiple correlation coefficient (ܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ , adjusted R2). The 
adjusted R-square value is adequate here, because it penalizes any unjustified increase in 
model complexity. The results for the three dependent variables indicate that Model 2 has 
more explanatory power than Model 1 (exit: Δܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .26, ݌ ൏ .001; passive opportunism: 
Δܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .21, ݌ ൏ .001; active opportunism: Δܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .14, ݌ ൏ .001), and in turn, Model 3 
has more explanatory power than Model 2 (exit: Δܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .03, ݌ ൏ .05; passive opportunism: 
Δܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .06, ݌ ൏ .01; active opportunism: Δܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .04, ݌ ൏ .05). Thus it is appropriate to 
use Model 3 to assess the hypotheses. Furthermore, Model 3 is supported by the data, because 
the R-square values of all endogenous constructs are substantial: exit (ܴଶ ൌ .36, ܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .33), 
passive opportunism (ܴଶ ൌ .40, ܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .36), and active opportunism (ܴଶ ൌ .29, ܴ௔ௗ௝ଶ ൌ .25). 
Next, we discuss the direct effects, before detailing the moderating effects and testing the 
hypotheses. 
 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 Risk propensity has a positive effect on exit (β = .12, p < .05), passive opportunism (β = 
.11, p < .05), and active opportunism (β = .17, p < .01). Risk-prone managers are more likely 
to exit the relationship and actively and passively act opportunistically than are risk-averse 
managers. Economic dissatisfaction has a significant and positive effect on exit (β = .11, p < 
.05) and passive opportunism (β = .21, p < .001). That is, when managers are economically 
dissatisfied with their relationship, they likely prefer to exit or use passive opportunism. The 
effect on active opportunism is not significant though (β = .08, p > .10). Social dissatisfaction 
has significant positive effects on exit (β = .44, p < .001), passive opportunism (β = .33, p < 
.001), and active opportunism (β = .30, p < .001): The more socially dissatisfied managers are, 
the more likely they are to exit the relationship and act, actively and passively, 
opportunistically. 
 We proposed in H1 that economic dissatisfaction moderates the relationship between risk 
propensity and destructive behavior. The results indicate that this interaction is significant and 
negative for passive opportunism (β = –.23, p < .05) and active opportunism (β = –.20, p < 
.05), but not for exit (β = –.05, p > .10). The negative sign means that the positive effect of risk 
propensity on passive and active opportunism becomes stronger as economic dissatisfaction 
decreases, in support of H1bc. Regarding H2, we proposed that social dissatisfaction 
moderates the relationship between risk propensity and destructive behavior. The results 
indicate positive and significant interaction terms (exit β = .20, p < .05; passive opportunism β 
= .19, p < .05; active opportunism β = .19, p < .05). The positive sign means that the positive 
effect of risk propensity on exit, passive opportunism, and active opportunism becomes 
stronger as social dissatisfaction increases, in support of H2a–c. 
4.3 Interpretation of the findings 
To interpret the findings, we plotted the interaction effects (see Figure 2). As depicted, the 
results show that economic and social forms of dissatisfaction have opposing, interactive 
effects on destructive behavior. Economic and social dissatisfaction invoke different time 
orientations in managers’ cognition. Managers with a long-term orientation are more sensitive 
to changes in social dissatisfaction, whereas managers with a short-term orientation are more 
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sensitive to changes in economic dissatisfaction. Thus, risk-averse managers, who have a 
short-term orientation, are more likely to perceive the present risk of acting destructively when 
economic dissatisfaction increases, compared with the future risk of not acting destructively. 
Conversely, risk-prone managers, who have a longer-term orientation, are more likely to 
perceive the future risk of not acting destructively when social dissatisfaction increases, 
compared with the present risk of acting destructively. 
 At high levels of economic dissatisfaction, risk propensity decreases the likelihood of 
active and passive opportunism, whereas at low levels of economic dissatisfaction, it increases 
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior (see Figure 2, Panels a-c). That is, in buyer–seller 
relationships characterized by high economic dissatisfaction, engaging in opportunism is likely 
to be perceived as less risky than not acting destructively; in relationships characterized by 
low economic dissatisfaction, engaging in such destructive behavior should be perceived as 
more risky than not behaving destructively. These findings are consistent with the shadow of 
the future argument and suggest that in a long-term relationship, the fear of retaliation likely 
curbs destructive behavior (Poppo et al., 2008). Opportunism has the potential to generate 
short-term benefits for the partner that initiates such behaviors, but when this partner holds an 
expectation that the relationship will endure, the shadow of the future can curb a manager’s 
actions in the present (Joshi and Stump, 1999). In contrast with expectations, the results 
suggest that risk propensity and economic dissatisfaction do not interact in influencing the 
intention to exit the relationship. This finding implies that, contrary to the shadow of the 
future, the shadow of the past has less influence on partners’ behavior. That is, the possible 
damage to the exiting partner’s reputation is not perceived as a risk. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The results further indicate that at high levels of social dissatisfaction, risk propensity 
increases the likelihood of destructive behavior, whereas at low levels, risk propensity 
decreases the likelihood of such destructive behavior (see Panels 2d-f). That is, in buyer–seller 
relationships characterized by high social dissatisfaction, engaging in destructive behavior is 
likely to be perceived as more risky than not acting destructively. In this situation, with low 
levels of affective commitment, partners likely enforce contractual mechanisms, which renders 
destructive behavior risky (Gilliland and Bello, 2002). Conversely, in relationships 
characterized by low social dissatisfaction, engaging in destructive behavior may be perceived 
as less risky than not behaving destructively, because affective commitment is high, and 
destructive behavior is more likely to be forgiven (Ganesan et al., 2010; Geiger et al., 2012). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to develop and empirically test a model that incorporates a 
moderating effect of the risk perceptions of situational factors on the relationship between a 
manager’s risk propensity and the inclination to act destructively. Overall, the results suggest 
that a manager’s perception of economic and social dissatisfaction moderates the relationship 
between this manager’s risk propensity and its proclivity to exit the relationship, and to engage 
in active and passive opportunism. 
 
5.1 Theoretical Contributions 
We make three theoretical contributions. First, we advance the supply chain management 
literature. Prior studies examining buyer–seller relationship have focused on situational factors 
to explain destructive behavior, thereby neglecting to take into account managers’ risk 
propensity (Das and Rahman, 2010; Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000; Ping, 1993). We show 
that, given a similar situation, managers with different levels of risk propensity might behave 
Destructive behavior in buyer–seller relationships 
14. 
differently. Destructive behavior could be perceived as more or less risky, depending on how 
the situation is framed, such that risk-averse and risk-prone managers likely respond 
differently to the same situation. Specifically, when a manager experiences economic 
dissatisfaction, a risk-prone manager is less likely to act destructively when compared to a 
risk-averse manager. Alternatively, when a manager experiences social dissatisfaction, a risk-
prone manager is more likely to act destructively when compared to a risk-averse manager. 
Accounting for managers’ risk propensity in explaining different types of destructive behavior 
is therefore critical. 
 Second, we advance the risk literature (e.g., Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Sitkin and Weingart, 
1996) by showing that disentangling the relationships between risk propensity, risk perception, 
and risk behavior provides insights that are not available were we to rely on just one of these 
concepts. Advocates of the trait approach argue that risk propensity directly affects risk 
behavior; proponents of the cognitive approach contend that risk perception critically affects 
risk behavior. The trait approach might be too deterministic in its assertion that the effect of 
risk propensity is consistent across contexts, because it assumes that risk propensity involves a 
stable personality characteristic that is difficult to change. As we show, the effect of risk 
propensity actually depends on managers’ cognitions, and their perception of the situation as 
satisfying or dissatisfying influences the relative perceived risk of acting or not acting. 
Managers’ perceptions moderate the effect of risk propensity, which provides an opportunity to 
influence their risk behavior; these perceptions can be influenced by one’s partner and by 
framing the situation differently (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Thus, only focusing on a 
manager’s risk propensity might be misleading. 
 The third contribution from analyzing destructive behavior at the managerial level is that, 
in contrast with different streams of literature that make implicit assumptions about the level 
of managers’ risk propensity, our study demonstrates the critical need to make this level 
explicit. Studies using an economic exchange perspective, such as transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1975), mostly assume that managers are risk averse. Consistent with this 
assumption, our findings show that when economic dissatisfaction is low, managers are less 
likely to act opportunistically, whereas they are more likely to do so when economic 
dissatisfaction is high. However, these findings are only valid for risk-averse managers. When 
managers are risk prone and their economic dissatisfaction is low, they are more likely to act 
opportunistically, but they are less likely to do so when economic dissatisfaction is high. 
Conversely, studies drawing on a social exchange perspective (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) 
assume that managers are risk prone. Our results show that only when social dissatisfaction is 
low are risk-prone managers less likely to act opportunistically and only when it is high are the 
managers more likely to engage in opportunism. When managers are risk averse, social 
dissatisfaction does not have a significant effect on their destructive behavior. Thus, the 
incompatible implications and diverging recommendations reported by prior studies that draw 
on economic versus social exchange theories could be reconciled by taking managers’ risk 
propensity into account. 
 
5.2 Managerial Implications 
In general, the supply chain management literature stipulates that exchange partners should 
concentrate on discouraging their counterpart’s destructive responses (see e.g. Grudinschi et 
al., 2014), as such acts may undermine the value creation potential of a buyer–seller 
relationship. To this extent, they should closely monitor their resellers’ economic and social 
satisfaction and should focus on preventing destructive behavior using contractual and 
relational governance. Our results imply that the use of governance systems should be adapted 
to the risk propensity of partners’ representatives. Using non-adapted mechanisms might 
induce, rather than prevent, destructive behavior. For example, the use of relational 
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governance mechanisms, such as building commitment and trust might be effective only with 
risk-prone partners; risk-averse managers are less sensitive to such relational mechanisms. To 
prevent destructive behavior from risk-averse partners, short-term economic incentives might 
be preferable. 
 Risk management approaches for buyer–seller relationship managers primarily focus on 
relationship level factors (Harland et al., 2003), such as types relationship risks and solutions, 
because management of relationship risk increase the likelihood of relationship success 
(Hoffman et al., 2013). It could be valuable to incorporate manager’s risk propensity in risk 
management approaches, as our study shows that varying degree of risk proneness 
differentially influence decision-making. For example, having managers working in teams 
may prevent the potentially adverse consequences of individual risk-taking behavior, as team 
members jointly decide on how to respond to a specific situation (Grudinschi et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, as part of risk management education, training initiatives may incorporate 
exercises and role plays to create awareness about a manager’s risk propensity, as this may 
prevent erroneous decision-making.  
 
5.3 Limitations and future research 
Our study provides several avenues for future research. Individual-level characteristics only 
determine directly and indirectly to 6–7% of explained variance, compared to the 20%–24% 
explained by situational factors. However, even if the contribution of a manager’s risk 
propensity seems rather small in comparison with the effects of the situational factors, it 
should be noticed that is only one facet of a manager’s personality. Studies grounded in upper 
echelons theory for example found that managers’ experiences, values, and personalities 
influence their interpretations of the situations they face and, in turn, affect their choices 
(Hambrick, 2007). Studies investigating how managers respond to adverse situations in 
alliance relationships suggest that taking account of managers’ cognitive and emotional 
processes might be fruitful candidates to further studies seeking to increase explanatory power 
(Vidal, 2014). Therefore, accounting for other personal traits and other individual-level factors 
should increase explained variance. 
 We focus on three destructive behaviors—exit, passive and active opportunism—, 
whereas other, more constructive, behaviors might also occur in buyer–seller relationships. For 
example, Rusbult and colleagues (1992) proposed the EVLN framework, which comprises 
four behaviors (exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect) organized along two dimensions: active–
passive and constructive–destructive behaviors. The EVLN typology has even been extended 
to seven behaviors by (Tjemkes and Furrer, 2010). In this study, we focus on destructive 
behavior to offer a more consistent theoretical framework. However, further studies would be 
useful to investigate if our findings also apply on the constructive side of managers’ behavior 
in buyer–seller relationships. 
 In addition, the three destructive behaviors we study are not independent, because 
managers can use combinations of destructive behaviors. Their interdependence thus could be 
modeled to determine if managers use them sequentially, as suggested by Ping (1999). For 
example, dissatisfied managers might start with passive or active opportunism; if their 
satisfaction does not improve, they might turn to exit. A study of sequential behavior requires 
longitudinal data. In contrast, we focus solely on unilateral responses and regard behavioral 
responses as a decision, made autonomously by one of the parties. 
 In terms of limitations, we measure behavioral intentions rather than actual behaviors. 
Intentions are not flawless predictors of behavior, though our approach attempts to assess 
preferences for using a particular behavioral response and thereby suggests behavioral 
intentions. Field studies recording purchasing managers’ actual behavior could complement 
our findings. It also might be helpful to investigate managers’ destructive behavior across 
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different phases of the buyer–seller relationship, as suggested by Claycomb and Frankwick 
(2010), because experience with a partner might generate different assessments of situational 
factors and their risk. 
 To conclude, by demonstrating that managers’ risk propensity influences preferences for 
acting opportunistically or exiting the relationship, both directly and interactively with 
relationship characteristics, our study offers new insights about buyer–seller relationship (risk) 
management. Relationship outcomes cannot be dissociated from the people who manage them, 
because managers’ risk propensity strongly influences their preferences for acting more or less 
destructively. 
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Table 1: Measurement Model Assessment 
Construct α ρc AVE     
Exit .80 .87 .63 2.52 1.31 .60 .96 
Passive opportunism .72 .82 .47 2.37 1.35 .83 .99 
Active opportunism .77 .85 .59 2.38 1.31 .66 .96 
Risk propensity .75 .83 .56 2.29 1.31 .77 .96 
Economic dissatisfaction .67 .80 .50 2.03 1.31 .75 .96 
Social dissatisfaction .77 .85 .59 2.37 1.31 .66 .96 
Notes: n = 262. Reliability and unidimensionality of reflective constructs; first and second eigenvalues and respective critical values 
are based on 1,000,000 permutations (Sahmer et al., 2006).
1λ  001.λcrit1 p 2λ  001.λcrit2 p
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. Exit 2.40 1.14 .79              
2. Passive opportunism 2.29 .96 .57 .69             
3. Active opportunism 2.43 1.13 .32 .46 .77            
4. Economic dissatisfaction 3.30 1.36 .32 .36 .23 .71           
5. Social dissatisfaction 2.25 1.29 .50 .42 .32 .40 .77          
6. Risk propensity 3.94 1.14 .22 .21 .26 .06 .20 .75         
7. Firm size (log empl.) 5.11 2.38 .05 −.08 .01 .05 .00 −.02         
8. Firm’s relative power 4.06 1.55 .06 −.05 .15 .00 −.11 .01 .15        
9. Alliance duration (log) 1.75 .74 −.01 .10 .02 −.13 −.02 −.01 −.09 −.10       
10. Rel.-specific investments 4.92 1.31 .02 −.12 .04 −.15 .05 .07 .06 .07 .01      
11. Alternative availability 4.20 1.09 .37 .25 .23 .21 .37 .13 .06 .12 .02 .10     
12. Long-term orientation 5.37 1.54 −.02 −.25 −.14 −.07 −.04 −.01 .01 .07 −.08 .09 .02    
13. Experience 2.86 1.53 .16 .09 .10 .25 .11 .00 −.13 −.06 −.11 −.03 .01 −.07   
14. Social desirability 7.70 1.49 −.13 −.10 −.18 −.09 −.04 −.16 −.02 .03 −.06 −.02 −.16 −.03 −.05  
15. Marker 5.63 1.21 −.03 −.16 −.05 −.27 −.08 .03 .00 −.02 .09 .01 .09 .05 −.14 .06 
Notes: n = 262. Correlations r > |.12| are significant at p < .05. Square root of the AVE appears in bold on the diagonal. 
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Table 3: Structural Model Results 
Independent variable (IV) 
DV: Exit DV: Passive Opportunism DV: Active Opportunism 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
β Sig.   β Sig.   β Sig. β Sig.   β Sig.   β Sig. β Sig.   β Sig.   β Sig. 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
Alliance duration (log) −.01 n.s.  .02 n.s.  −.00 n.s. .09 °  .11 **  .09 * .04 n.s.  .05 n.s.  .03 n.s. 
Alternative availability .15 *  .14 **  .13 * .15 *  .15 **  .16 ** .05 n.s.  .04 n.s.  .04 n.s. 
Experience .18 **  .11 *  .12 * .06 n.s.  −.01 n.s.  .01 n.s. .11 *  .06 n.s.  .08 n.s. 
Long-term orientation −.03 n.s.  .00 n.s.  .02 n.s. −.23 ***  −.21 ***  −.18 *** −.16 **  −.13 **  −.11 * 
Firm's relative power .05 n.s.  .09 °  .11 * −.04 n.s.  −.00 n.s.  .02 n.s. .17 **  .19 **  .21 *** 
Marker −.02 n.s.  .01 n.s.  .04 n.s. −.16 **  −.11 *  −.09 * −.01 n.s.  .00 n.s.  .02 n.s. 
Social desirability −.11 *  −.07 °  −.07 ° −.08 n.s.  −.03 n.s.  −.04 n.s. −.19 ***  −.14 **  −.15 ** 
Firm size (log employees) .06 n.s.  .05 n.s.  .05 n.s. −.05 n.s.  −.07 °  −.08 * .01 n.s.  −.01 n.s.  −.02 n.s. 
Rel. specific investments −.01 n.s.  −.05 n.s.  −.03 n.s. −.02 n.s.  −.04 n.s.  .00 n.s. .05 n.s.  −.01 n.s.  .03 n.s. 
D
i
r
e
c
t
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
Risk propensity       .13 **   .12 *       .13 **   .11 *       .18 ***   .17 ** 
Economic dissatisfaction    .12 *  .11 *    .22 ***  .21 ***    .09 °  .08 n.s. 
Social dissatisfaction       .42 ***   .44 ***       .30 ***   .33 ***       .27 ***   .30 *** 
M
o
d
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
Risk propensity × 
Economic dissatisfaction       −.05 n.s.       −.23 *       −.20 * 
Risk propensity × Social 
dissatisfaction       .20 * 
            .19 *             .19 * 
   Model Fit  Model Fit  Model Fit Model Fit  Model Fit  Model Fit Model Fit  Model Fit  Model Fit 
  R² .07   .33   .36  .13   .34   .40  .10   .24   .29  
  Adjusted R² .04 ***  .30 ***  .33 *** .10 ***  .31 ***  .36 *** .07 ***  .21 ***  .25 *** 
    Δ adjusted R²      .26 ***   .03 *      .21 ***   .05 **       .14 ***   .04 * 
Notes: n = 262. 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.010; * p < 0.050; ° p < 0.100, one-sided test; n.s. not significant 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
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Figure 2: Interaction Effects 
 
 
d) f) 
a) b) c) 
e) 
Behavioral Responses to Dissatisfying Channel Relationships 
26. 
Appendix: Measurement Items and Standardized Loadings 
Indicators StandardizedPLS Loadings
Dependent variables  
Exit (based on Geyskens and Steenkamp 2000; Ping 1999)  
I think that I will probably stop doing business with this supplier .74
I am not likely to continue the alliance with this supplier  .85 
I believe that I will terminate the relationship with this supplier  .75 
I have the intention to exit the relationship with this supplier .82 
Passive opportunism (based on Ping 1993)  
I do not plan anything extra to solve the situation with this supplier .65 
I will not initiate anything to improve the situation with this supplier .66 
I will not deal with the situation  .69 
I do not intent to put any effort in the relationship with this supplier to improve the situation .73 
I will not put any more resources (time and money) into the relationship with this supplier .71 
Active opportunism (based on John (1984); Ping (1993))  
I will purposefully exaggerate the situation in order to get additional benefits .70 
I will change the facts slightly in order to get what I need from my partner. .75 
I will describe the situation as negatively as possible to this partner in order to gain additional benefits  .80 
I will deliberately make the situation sound more problematic than it really is to obtain more benefits
from the relationship with this partner  
.82 
  
Independent variables  
Risk propensity (based on Jaworski and Kohli 1993)  
I believe that higher risks are worth taking for higher rewards .60 
I accept occasional failures as being normal .64 
I like to take big risks .89 
I encourage the development of risky strategies, knowing that some of them will fail .83 
Economic dissatisfaction (based on Geyskens and Steenkamp 2000; Tjemkes and Furrer 2010)  
The relationship with this partner has provided my firm with profits (r) .69 
Overall, the performance of this alliance is very satisfactory (r) .75 
This alliance has realized the goals my firm set out to achieve (r) .72 
The relationship with this partner is very attractive with respect to efficiency (r) .67 
Social dissatisfaction (based on Geyskens and Steenkamp 2000; Tjemkes and Furrer 2010)  
This partner only expresses negative criticism about my firm .71 
This partner leaves my firm in the dark about things my firm ought to know .78 
This partner refuses to explain the reasons for its policies .81 
The working relationship between my firm and this partner is characterized by feelings of hostility .78 
  
Notes: n. = 262; (r) = reversed item. 
 
 
